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Abstract
Real investments involving irreversibility and ambiguity embed a positive quasi−option
value under ambiguity (q.o.v.a.), which modifies the evaluation of an investment decision
involving depletion of natural resources by increasing the value of delaying. Q.o.v.a. depends
on the specific decision−maker attitude towards ambiguity, expressed by a capacity on the
state space. An empirical measure of q.o.v.a. is pointed out. Exploiting the properties of a
capacity and its conjugate, the relationship has been established between the upper and lower
Choquet integral with respect to a subadditive capacity and the bid and ask price of the
underlying asset (output) of the investment decision. The empirical measure of q.o.v.a. is
defined as the upper bound of the opportunity value. As an example, q.o.v.a. is applied to
evaluate an off−shore petroleum lease under ambiguity.
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Irreversibility and uncertainty characterize development decisions involving
non-renewable assets, such as energy-generating resources like coal, oil and
natural gas. Irreversibility breaks the temporal symmetry between the past
and the future in the consumption decision of natural resources. Uncertainty
occurs when consequences of development decisions cannot be fully deter-
mined ex-ante and all the uncontrolled variables of the decision process are
random variables, which only depend on the possible state of nature that will
occur in the future.
In seminal articles, Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry (1974a, 1974b)
independently point out that under uncertainty, when a given decision could
(at least partially) have irreversible eﬀects and learning is possible before
future decisions have to be made, it is generally valuable to keep open an
option, even if the decision-maker is risk neutral and her marginal utility is
constant. They call quasi-option value the extra value attached to the preser-
vation of an option in order to stress the crucial role played by irreversibility
and learning and show its independence from risk attitude.
Some diﬀerent methods of measuring quasi-option value have been sug-
gested in the context of empirical decision problems. The most notable of
these is real-option analysis.1 Real-option pricing theory considers an irre-
versible investment as a ﬁnancial call option, which provides the possibility
of waiting for new information to arrive that might aﬀect the desirability
or timing of the expenditure. Applications involving ﬁnancial instruments
and project-investment valuations have a common element for using option
pricing.
It has been argued (Basili, 1998) that the tool of quasi-option value (real-
option value) should be augmented to encompass ambiguity. In this paper
an empirical measure of quasi-option value under ambiguity (q.o.v.a.)i sp r o -
posed and evaluated. Both the decision-maker’s priors and conjugate beliefs
are considered and the upper and lower value of the contingent claim are
derived. For each investment project, two quasi-option values are obtained:
the greater of them is taken as the measure of q.o.v.a.. As an example, an ap-
plication of q.o.v.a. is considered for the case of an oﬀshore petroleum lease.
It is shown that the q.o.v.a. modiﬁes the value of the exclusive rights to the
1Myers and Majd, 1983; McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Majd and Pindyck, 1987; Paddock
‘et. al.’,1988.
1project.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes quasi-option value
and quasi-option value under ambiguity. In Section 3 an empirical measure of
q.o.v.a. is proposed. Section 4 contains the example of a possible application
to an oﬀshore oil tract. Section 5 concludes. The proof of our main claim is
in the appendix.
2 Quasi-option value and quasi-option value
under ambiguity.
Arrow and Fisher (1974) introduce the notion of quasi-option value and argue
that whenever uncertainty is assumed, “even where it is not appropriate to
postulate risk aversion in evaluating an activity, something of the feel of risk
aversion is produced by a restriction on reversibility of decision” (Arrow and
Fisher, 1974, p.318). Henry (1974b) shows that replacing the initial random
problem by an associated riskless problem, i.e. an equivalent certainty case,
the decision-maker could obtain a non-optimal solution, even if she is risk
neutral and the payoﬀ function is quadratic. Quasi-option value (q.o.v.)i s
equal to the maximum diﬀerence between R∗, the expected revenue of the
random problem, and R, the expected revenue of the riskless problem, that
is q.o.v. = max[R∗−R,0]. The quasi-option value represents the conditional
value of information, conditional to the reversible action.
It is worth noting that an irreversible investment opportunity is equivalent
to a ﬁnancial perpetual call option on common stock,2 where the investment
expenditure is the exercise price and the project value, which is the expected
payoﬀ from investing, is a share of the underlying asset. Dixit and Pindyck
derive “the value of the extra freedom, namely the option to postpone the
decision” (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p.97), as the diﬀerence between the ex-
pected net present values of random problem and associated riskless one.
Pindyck (1991) observes that dynamic programming and contingent claims
analysis yield the identical solution (rule that maximizes the market value
of the investment opportunity), if the decision-maker is risk neutral3 and
2A disinvestment opportunity (partial reversibility) is equivalent to a put option and
the act to disinvest is equivalent to exercise such an option.
3Risk neutrality means that the discount rate equals the risk-free rate (e.g., Cox and
Ross, 1976).
2the risk-free interest rate replaces the discount rate. Given markets com-
plete or at least suﬃciently complete (spanning assumption), the value of a
project and the value of the option to invest is determined by constructing
a replicating portfolio or ﬁnding some perfectly correlated assets and using
option-pricing theory.4 That is, the value of the option to invest is based
on the construction of a risk-free portfolio in which the asset is traded (long
or short position) or by ﬁnding another asset or a combination of some as-
sets, whose prices are perfectly correlated with the price of the output of the
investment project, if that asset is not traded.
Models explaining quasi-option value (real option value) assume that
states of nature have an additive probability of occurring, that is, the decision-
maker’s description of states of nature is exhaustive. The decision-maker has
(explicitly or implicitly) a unique probability distribution over events and
points out an expected utility function linear in probabilities. It is therefore
impossible to deal with ambiguous decision problems. On the contrary, if
decision-maker faces ambiguity, it becomes necessary to generalize the q.o.v.
to assess the value of her uncertain and irreversible decision. Indeed, it
can be done introducing the notion of quasi-option value under ambiguity,
q.o.v.a. This diﬀers from Arrow and Fisher and Henry, who assume events
have an additive probability to occur and can thus derive the expected value
associated to each possible decision. Events under ambiguity are measured
by capacities, that express both events’ uncertainty and decision maker’s
attitude towards it. As a consequence, the quasi-option value measure is
generalized by means of the proper Choquet Integral of the decision maker
on the underlying assets.
3 An empirical measure of quasi-option value
under ambiguity.
Real option-pricing theory considers that the decision-maker faces various
forms of risk, such as uncertainty over future product prices, operating costs,
future interest rates, cost and timing of the investment itself. Uncertainty is
represented by a set of states of nature, one of which will be revealed as true
4If the spanning assumption does not hold, it is possible to value the investment project
and the decision to invest by dynamic programming with an exogenous discount rate
(Pindyck, 1991,p . 1116).
3and option-pricing will determine the optimal exercise rule of an investment.
Given competitive markets, no transaction costs and asset prices that follow
diﬀusion processes, it is assumed a unique probability distribution p → [0,1]
o nt h em e a s u r a b l es p a c e(Ω,S), such that market value of any asset is the
expectation of its discounted payments. The asset, which spans the stochastic
changes in the project worth, may be considered a random variable β : Ω → R




As a result, there is only one opportunity value or quasi-option value for each
irreversible investment project.
Consider an optimistic decision-maker: she has a concave5 capacity v :
S → [0,1] o nt h em e a s u r a b l es p a c e(Ω,S) and the valuation of the asset
will not be the Lebesgue integral of its expected discounted payments (linear
pricing rule), but it will be obtained by the Choquet integral of the expected





The optimist decision-maker might be considered as a ﬁnancial dealer6























− βdv : there is a bid-ask
spread of the asset β, and the dealer makes a positive proﬁt.
The bid and ask prices of the underlying asset can be seen as respectively
the worst and the best expected payoﬀ of an irreversible investment project.
T h eo p t i m i s t i cd e c i s i o n - m a k e rc o n s i d e r st h ea s kp r i c eo ft h ea s s e tβ as the
lowest price (upper bound) at which she will wish to sell the asset, consistent
with her priors. She considers the bid price of the asset β as the highest price
(lower bound) up to which she will wish to buy the asset β, compatible with
her beliefs (Basili and Fontini, 2002).
Summing up, the decision-maker assumes that the true probability dis-
tribution of the asset β payments is located in the set P of probability
5We suppose that optimists (pessimists) hold concave (convex) capacities. This is
coherent with Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), where it is shown that concavity (con-
vexity) is a suﬃcient conditions for preferences to exhibit uncertainty favour (aversion).
For a diﬀerent approach, see Epstein (1999).
6There is some empirical evidence that professional delaers hold subadditive (concave)
capacities (Fox ‘et. al.’, 1996)
4distributions, even if she has complete ignorance about its location. As a
consequence, the ask price of the asset β is supposed to be the supremum
of the family of mathematical expectation with respect to every probability
distribution in P, whereas the bid price is supposed to be the inﬁmum of the
same family of mathematical expectation. These two asset values crucially
depend on ambiguity: the higher the degree of uncertainty (Marinacci, 2000)
the longer the interval. Given the relationship between the lower and upper
Choquet integral with respect to the subadditive capacity v and the bid and
ask price of the asset β, it is possible to compute the lower and upper bound
of the investment opportunity value, by considering the diﬀusion processes
of the bid and ask prices. Therefore, the following holds true:
Proposition 1 The empirical measure of quasi-option value under ambigu-
ity (q.o.v.a.) included in an investment project is the maximum value of a
development opportunity.
Proof. In Appendix
4 An example: the q.o.v.a. of an oﬀshore
petroleum lease
In the case of a natural resource the value of the underlying asset largely de-
pends on the price and the available quantity of the resource. Consider the
case of an oﬀshore petroleum lease.7 The valuation and exploitation of an
oﬀ-shore oil tract can be considered as a compound option (exploration, de-
velopment and extraction), whose value depends on production cost, current
oil price, expected changing of oil price, volume of the undeveloped reserve.
For simplicity’s sake, assume that the company concluded the exploration
phase with an estimated oil reserve of 50 million barrels and obtained a pro-
duction license or concession. At this stage of the investment process, the
company has to decide whether to exploit the reserve and start development
or to abandon it. The company faces the development stage that involves
consequences, i.e. a monetary revenue, to each possible state of nature and
cost of installing productive capacity (i.e. constructing rig and drilling pro-
duction wells). Assume that costs of developing the reserve are ﬁxed and
7See Paddock ‘et al.’ 1988.
5occur in one instantaneous lump sum. Relinquishment requirement lasts 20
years and oil is available for sale after one year.
The development decision is represented as a sequential process in which
all available choices are either to invest in development at once or to wait
for additional information. At the beginning, the company faces ambiguity
in oil price. Ambiguity is resolved over time and developing the reserve is
not a "now or never"’ opportunity but a "now or next period" one. Yet, if
development is exercised, the option to invest will be killed and lost forever.
In this investment process involving ambiguity and learning, the notion of
q.o.v.a. emerges and can be determined by considering the bid and ask prices
of the oil.
Consider the following q.o.v. formula:8
q.o.v. = S · e
−ytN(d1) − K · e
−rtN(d2) (1)
where:
• S = net current value of the underlying asset9
• K = strike price of the option (cost of developing the reserve)
• t = time to expiration on the option (relinquishment requirement)
• r = riskless interest rate corresponding to the life of the option
• σ2 = variance in the ln(price) of the underlying asset
• y = dividend yield or cost to delay
• N(d1),N(d2)=normal standard cumulative distributions10
• d1 = [ln( S




• d2 = d1 − σ
√
t
8See, for instance, Damodaran, 2000.
9In our example the net current value of the underlying asset is equal to the price minus
the average cost of each barrel times the overall amount of the reserve (50 million barrels)
discounted by the annual rate derived from the life of the option (20 years).
10N(d1) and N(d2) are probabilities and represent the likelihood that the option will
have a positive cash-ﬂow at the exercise. They are components of the replicating portfolio.
6In this example, it is assumed that the spot price of oﬀshore oil11 is $43.34,
marginal cost per barrel is $11.50,the the strike price equals $1600 millions
and the riskless rate is 6%. Since cash ﬂows are evenly distributed over 20
years (life of the option) the dividend yield equals 5%.
Taking the ask price of oil12 we obtain: σ2 =0 .002012; σ =0 .04485447;
d1 =0 .829115; d2 =0 .62852;w h i c hy i e l d :N(d1)=0 .7965; N(d2)=0 .7352.
Given equation 1 the q.o.v. (in million of dollars) is:
q.o.v.1 =$ 3 8 .9017 (2)
L e tu st a k en o wt h eb i dp r i c eo fo i l . W eh a v e : σ2 =0 .001880; σ =
0.043356703; d1 =0 .850943; d2 =0 .657046,a n do b t a i nN(d1)=0 .8026;
N(d2)=0 .7444. Equation 1 yields the following:
q.o.v.2 =$ 3 8 .5486 (3)
The q.o.v.a. is the highest q.o.v. of the uncertain decision problem. It
corresponds in this example to q.o.v.1 = $38.9017. In other words, even
though the present value of developing the reserve is lower than its cost
(1516.19M$ < 1600M$), its development has a positive quasi-option value
under uncertainty. This is due to the variance (risk) of future prices and the
uncertainty about it, which induces the optimistic dealer to take the highest
value of q.o.v., i.e., the q.o.v. evaluated using the ask prices.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s .
Ambiguity is the prevalent condition in projects of development that in-
volve energy-generating natural resources and this paper suggests an empir-
ical measure of the quasi-option value under ambiguity. Generalizing quasi-
option pricing theory under ambiguity and evaluating the underlying asset
by the Choquet integral of its expected payments it is possible to obtain two
quasi-option values. They are derived by considering the relationship be-
tween the decision-maker’s priors and conjugate beliefs and the bid and ask
prices of the underlying asset. The empirical measure of quasi-option value
under ambiguity equals the maximum expected value of the investment op-
portunity, compatible with the decision-maker’s priors. As a consequence,
11Reference price: Crude Oil (NYM), 11/30/2004.
12Source: MRCI’s delayed quotes and bid-asks, available on-line (http://www.mrci.com).
7the value of an investment project increases when ambiguity increases. In-
deed, the lesser the trust in the likelihood of events, the larger the diﬀerence
between the two investment opportunity values.
The q.o.v.a can induce a more conservative policy whenever investment
decisions about the exploitation of energy-leading natural resources involve
their depletion. It generalizes real option applications and could be taken into
account when valuing R&D programs, patents, internet ﬁrms and investment
decisions characterized by vague information.
6 Appendix.
Given normalization and monotonicity with respect to set inclusion, suppose
that the capacity v is monotonically sequentially continuous and compatible
with a probability p,t h a ti s ,f o ra l ls1,s 2 ∈ S, p(s1) ≤ p(s2) implies v(s1) ≤
v(s2),and for all s ∈ S, sn ↑ s implies v(sn) ↑ v(s) and sn ↓ s implies
v(sn) ↓ v(s). The proof of the Proposition derives from the following two
Lemmas:
Lemma 1 Under the hypotheses of monotonicity with respect to set inclu-
sion, monotone sequential continuity and compatibility, there exists a unique
concave capacity v on (Ω,S),s u c ht h a t :
R
Ω
βdv =m a x {
R
Ω
βdp | p ∈ P =
core(v)}.
Proof. See Chateauneuf, 1991, Theorem 3’
Remark 1 The Choquet integral of β with respect to v is equal to the maxi-
mum of a family of Lebesgue integrals with respect to the family of probability
distributions P on (Ω,S), such that for all s1 ∈ S, v(s1) ≤ p(s1). It corre-
sponds to the ask price of the replicating asset β.
Lemma 2 Deﬁne v∗(si)=v(Ω) − v(sc
i),w h e r esc
i is the complement of si.
Call v∗ the dual capacity of v. It provides a measure of the extent to which
the decision-maker believes the negation of si is true. If no monotonicity
with respect to set inclusion, monotone sequential continuity and compatibility







βdp∗ | p∗ ∈ P = core(v)}.
8Proof. See Schmeidler, 1989, Proposition and Remark 6.
Remark 2 The Choquet integral of β with respect to v∗ equals the minimum
Lebesgue integral with respect to the family of probability distributions P;i t
reveals the worst expectation of the optimistic decision-maker; it corresponds







βdv∗ (Denneberg, Proposition 5.1 (iii), pag 64).
P r o o fo ft h eP r o p o s i t i o n . Because of Lemma 1,t h eq.o.v. evaluated
with respect to the capacity v is not smaller than the q.o.v. evaluated with
respect to an additive probability p ∈ core(v), where the latter is the q.o.v.
without ambiguity (since it is the value of the investment opportunity derived
by using option-pricing theory, taking into account stochastic changes in the
underlying asset β only). On the other hand, Lemma 2 shows that the
q.o.v. evaluated taking the bid price is not bigger than the ambiguity-free
q.o.v. (since it is the minimum expectations of additive probabilities that are
i nt h ec o r eo fv). Therefore, for optimistic decision makers whenever there
is a bid-ask spread, the q.o.v. using the ask price is higher that the q.o.v.
using the bid, and it is the highest q.o.v. compatible with P. This proves the
Proposition: q.o.v.a. is computed with respect to the maximum probability
distribution in P.
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